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This conference volume asks what impact globalization has on poverty.
What role are theorists to play in these discussions? A temptation is simply
to write yet another model using newer and cooler techniques drawn from
other ﬁelds, but we are skeptical about whether this is what the world really
needs (at least at the moment). In this, we are on the side of Descartes, who
in his Discourse on Method enjoins the researcher to proceed from the
simple to the complex. We think that we need to start with the absolutely
simplest models that we can and add complexity only as persistent empir-
ical evidence forces us to do so. At least as a starting point, the null hy-
pothesis should not be too complex.
Having argued that we should start with very simple models and add
complexity only as necessary, let us head in the other direction and critique
our ﬁxation on the predictions of the simplest models. Models exist to
make a point. Just as a toy hammer prepares a child to use a real hammer,
our toy models provide us with insights that will be immensely useful when
we turn to more complex problems. But when we need to pound in a nail,
we don’t want to use a toy hammer. And we should be equally cautious
about spending all of our time testing toy theories or interpreting the data
in terms of these theories. We shouldn’t ignore them, discard them, or least
of all mutilate them. But we do need to ask what the deep lesson is to be
learned from the simple models and how one should go about using this in-
sight in a more complex setting.
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the International Monetary Fund, its executive board, or its management.For theorists, this poses a clear problem. As we will see below, the data
keep pushing us toward a world much less tidy than the elegant one where
we spend most of our time theorizing. Why can’t we live in a world more
amenable to crisp models? For the data analyst, it likewise poses a problem.
How do we make use of the real insights of the simple models in a world
more complex by far?
One of the diﬃculties in reading empirical analyses for someone of the-
oretical proclivities is that the models under study are frequently alluded to
only vaguely. What are the competing models of the world? What would
lead us to believe one rather than another? When the prediction of one
model is hard to ﬁnd in the data, what are we to believe about the world?
Too often one can’t ﬁnd a clear discussion.
Even if we trim down considerably the question of globalization and
poverty to examine the relation between openness and wages, this is still a
vast ﬁeld with many diﬀerent questions and diﬃcult problems. What is the
impact of liberalization by one country on wages of various groups in that
country? What is the impact of liberalization by a large number of coun-
tries? What is the impact of diﬀerent types of liberalization on wages? The
approach that you would want will depend importantly on which question
you want to answer.
Let’s think for a while about the trading system as a whole. What model
do you want to have in mind of the determinants of world trading patterns
when we do this? Because we are now talking about world general equilib-
rium, we should realize that there are as many diﬀerent potential models as
there are models of any element of the economy. Trade economists spend
most of their time working with just a small set of these when considering
questions of trade patterns—Ricardo, Heckscher-Ohlin (-Vanek), speciﬁc
factors, monopolistic competition, economic geography, dynamic models
of accumulation, growth, and trade, and models of trade and technical
change. If we ask which of these are relevant to the world we live in, surely
the answer is—all of them! The question should rather be to establish in
which contexts each is helpful and to establish magnitudes.
There are theory crimes and there are data crimes. Sometimes we manage
both at the same time. We commit theory crimes constantly—toy models
are entirely in the realm of theory crimes. But they are misdemeanors in the
service of higher ideals, namely, developing our intuition about the work-
ings of the models. Theory felonies occur when we are so entranced by the
elegance of our toy models that we lose sight of the question we are trying
to answer, indeed come to believe that we have provided an answer even
when clearly central aspects of the problem are addressed inappropriately.
A prime example is the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The year 1991
marked the ﬁftieth anniversary of the publication of the article by Wolf-
gang Stolper and Paul Samuelson that provided the ﬁrst statement and
proof of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. To observe this golden jubilee,
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conference in honor of this celebrated theorem. One of the highlights of the
resulting volume (Deardorﬀ and Stern 1994) was the original letter from
the editor of the American Economic Review, which praised the paper for
its “brilliant theoretical performance” but nonetheless rejected it for pub-
lication on the basis that it does not “have anything to say about any of the
real situations with which the theory of international trade has to concern
itself” (P. T. Homan, quoted in Deardorﬀand Stern 1994, xi). The conven-
tional view of this referee report is that it is a howler, a monumental gaﬀe,
a high-water mark on the seas of academic idiocy. Yet the present paper
will argue that, in one of the theorem’s central applications, the referee re-
port got it about right.
It is time to declare Stolper-Samuelson dead. A theorem, of course, is im-
mortal. It is a logical relation that existed before there were humans and will
survive them, just as surely as the theorem of Pythagoras. And the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem has the hallmarks of great economic theory: an issue of
great substantive importance, elegant analytics, and surprising results. Yet
an enormous problem arises when we try to apply the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem, unthinkingly, speciﬁcally to the question of the consequences of
trade liberalization for the poorest or least skilled in poor countries. In this
context, Stolper-Samuelson has become a central reference point, indeed
a mantra, a totem: “Stolper-Samuelson says that trade liberalization will
raise the real income of the abundant (unskilled) labor in poor countries.”
Stolper-Samuelson, qua theorem, is not wrong, of course. But if we use it,
as we so often have, as if it provides a reliable answer to this question of real
human signiﬁcance, then it is worse than wrong—it is dangerous.
Of course, the fact that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem fails to be robust
to theoretical departures from its core assumptions is not news. Hence, we
will spare the reader a catalog of alternative theoretical assumptions that vi-
tiate Stolper-Samuelson. Rather, we hope to appeal to a selection of recent
empirical work on the part of trade economists that suggests that the con-
ventional way of thinking about applying Stolper-Samuelson is hopeless.
2.1 A Primer on Issues with Stolper-Samuelson
The aim of this section is to give trade and nontrade economists a simple
common language both to understand the insights of Stolper-Samuelson
and also to understand its shortcomings as a tool for examining the prob-
lems of trade liberalization in developing countries. To do so, we will aim
to develop a transparent exposition of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and
add some amendments that build our intuition about dimensions of ro-
bustness of the theorem, but also steer the conversation toward the dimen-
sions in which the practical or real-world use of the theorem breaks down.
Consider the case of a country that is small in the world market for two
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ﬁxed-coeﬃcient technologies in the two inputs, say, skilled and unskilled
labor (H and L). Perfect competition is assumed to reign in all goods and
factor markets, and there are no geographical or sectoral barriers to mo-
bility within a country. Let X be the skill-intensive good. Assume that both
goods are produced in this country in equilibrium (ﬁg. 2.1).
Under these conditions, price must equal unit cost. For the Y sector, this
is easily written as
P Y   wHaHY   wLaLY .
If we want to graph this in factor price space, we simply get
wH   wL.
This is a simple linear equation with slope equal to minus the inverse of the
skill intensity. Equivalently, the skill intensity is given as the slope of the
normal to the unit cost curve (so the “ﬂat” line is that of the skill-intensive
X sector).
Even before we establish equilibrium factor prices, there are lessons to
be learned here that are more general than the framework we are using. The
ﬁrst is that we need to pay attention to which goods price we are looking
at—namely, the domestic price. Second is that here this price gives us the
aLY  
aHY
P Y  
aHY
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Fig. 2.1 Trade liberalization and factor prices: Stolper-Samuelson theoremrevenue available to pay domestic factors of production. If the domestic
price falls, and the good continues to be produced under the same technology,
then some factor of production must receive less in compensation. If we
think we see a good produced before and after a drastic trade liberaliza-
tion, but we can’t seem to ﬁnd any factor that has had more than a trivial
change in its factor return, then we had better look again. One possibility
is that the goods on which we liberalized trade are not really the same as
the goods we are producing, and so they had a zero or negligible eﬀect on
domestic prices of the goods we do produce. A second possibility would be
some kind of “induced technical change” in which the unit input coeﬃ-
cients fall with liberalization so that wages can be maintained. If this
change in the apparent unit input coeﬃcients represented increased eﬀort,
then one should be cautious to note the losses in real income implied by the
disutility of the added eﬀort.
With the relative goods price and technology given exogenously, the
single competitive cost condition above is insuﬃcient to determine two fac-
tor prices. However, these can be determined given the corresponding unit
cost condition for X:
wH   wL
Positive production of both goods requires that the associated zero-proﬁt
conditions intersect in the nonnegative orthant of factor price space and
that the country’s endowments lie in the range spanned by the two goods’
factor intensities. For now we assume this to be true. Then the factor prices
are determined by the intersection of the two zero-proﬁt lines—that is,
consistent with price equal to unit cost in both sectors.
The conventional argument that the unskilled in poor countries will ben-
eﬁt from trade liberalization requires just a few more steps. Assume that
the poor country is an exporter of the unskilled-intensive good and im-
porter of the skill-intensive good. Then P Y P∗
Y and P X (1  t) P∗
X, where
P X and P∗
X denote the domestic and foreign prices respectively of the skill-
intensive good; P Yand P∗
Ydenote the same for the unskilled-intensive good.
Removal of the tariﬀ lowers the domestic price of the skill-intensive im-
portable X without aﬀecting that of the exportable Y. The reader can eas-
ily convince herself, based on this diagram or simple algebra, that the
skilled wage falls in terms of both goods and the unskilled wage rises in
terms of both goods (ﬁg. 2.1).1 This is the source of the conventional
aLX  
aHX
P X  
aHX
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1. The simplest way to see this graphically is to note how far the skilled wage would have
fallen if the proportional decline in the price of X had fallen proportionally on both factors.
Since equilibrium skilled wage with active production of both goods falls farther yet, clearly
the real wage has fallen in terms of both goods. Correspondingly, the new equilibrium fea-
tures a higher nominal unskilled wage here, hence also real wage, since the price of Y is un-
changed and that of X fell.statement that “trade theory” suggests that liberalization will raise the
wages of the unskilled in unskilled abundant countries.
Before moving on to critiques of this conventional wisdom, we touch on
a couple of additional topics. One is the role of nontraded goods. In this
conventional setting, the prices of traded goods have already established
the two factor prices (assuming both traded goods are always produced) as
a function of the two domestic traded goods prices. Given these factor
prices, cost minimization determines the price of nontraded goods, hence
the demand in the nontraded sector, and local supply meets exactly that de-
mand. Local demand shocks for nontraded have no eﬀect on the equilib-
rium price of nontraded goods (i.e., they are met with a pure supply ad-
justment) so long as both traded goods continue to be produced. Hence a
long tradition by trade economists of ignoring nontraded sectors—which
are typically the majority of output!—in discussions of trade and factor
prices.
We now introduce the concept of a noncompeting good. Up to now we
have assumed that there is local production of all goods that are interna-
tionally traded. What happens if there is some good Z that is produced else-
where (continue assuming we are small in world markets) but consumed
here? We can call Z a noncompeting good because there is no local pro-
duction and (by assumption) changes in tariﬀs on Z do not aﬀect domes-
tic prices of goods we do produce. In this case, the removal of a tariﬀ on Z
is a pure source of consumption gain for our consumers without aﬀecting
the product wages of skilled and unskilled in terms of X and Y. Both fac-
tors have higher real wages.
It is easiest to introduce the idea of intermediates here in a model in
which the intermediate is a noncompeting good that also enters with a ﬁxed
coeﬃcient (say one unit of intermediate per unit of output, say in the X sec-
tor). As before, let P X   (1   t)P∗
X be the domestic price of the importable
good. But now allow for an imported intermediate with price P∗
Z subject to
a tariﬀ tZ. Then the domestic price must cover both payments to factors
and the cost of intermediates; hence, we must amend the zero-proﬁt con-
dition of X to read
(1   t)P∗
X   wHaHX   wLaLX   (1   tZ)P∗
Z.
That is, the domestic price now must suﬃce to pay both domestic factors
plus the tariﬀ-inclusive price of intermediates. Rearranging, this also yields
(1   t)P∗
X   (1   tZ)P∗
Z   wHaHX   wLaLX.
The left-hand side is now the per-unit revenue associated with producing
X, net of payments for intermediates, that can be used to compensate do-
mestic factors. The important point to note is that t, the tariﬀ on the do-
mestically produced ﬁnal product, and tZ, the tariﬀ on the imported inter-
mediate, enter with opposite signs. A tariﬀ on imports of the ﬁnal good is
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output); a tariﬀ on imports of the intermediate import is antiprotective
(yields less revenue to compensate domestic factors per unit output). Or
most simply of all, for an import competing producer, a tariﬀ on ﬁnal out-
put is good news, while a tariﬀ on intermediates is bad news. (Of course, if
Z is steel and X is autos and both are domestically produced, then a tariﬀ
on Z is protective for steel but antiprotective for autos in the sense outlined
here.) Figure 2.2shows that the reduction in tariﬀon the intermediate good
Z shifts the unit cost curve outward (since, given the price of X, for each
value of wL, wHwill have to rise), unlike the reduction in tariﬀon ﬁnal good
X. This would lead to an increase in the returns to high-skill labor and a de-
crease in the returns to low-skilled labor and hence an increase in wage in-
equality. Thus, it is possible that trade liberalization beneﬁts the skilled la-
bor in poor countries if liberalization takes place in the intermediates. The
eﬀect is exactly opposite to that shown in ﬁgure 2.1.
Nearly all of the theoretical elements of the Stolper-Samuelson frame-
work are reasonable objects of scrutiny. We will emphasize some more than
others, not because they are the only important ones but because, based on
existing models and data work in international trade, these seem to be the
most troublesome elements. No doubt other elements will need to be added
later. We will especially emphasize those relevant for people who would
like to do empirical work on trade liberalization in poor countries. We’ll
postpone until later speaking about imperfections in goods and factor
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Fig. 2.2 Trade liberalization in intermediates and factor pricesmarkets, although these are also surely present in developing countries, be-
cause many very signiﬁcant problems emerge for Stolper-Samuelson with-
out worrying about these.
In thinking about problems of international trade, and speciﬁcally in
thinking about Stolper-Samuelson, there is above all one whirlpool to
which the siren song calls most strongly both to theorists and empiricists.
This is the question of aggregation—most importantly here, the aggrega-
tion of goods. When we say that Stolper-Samuelson suggests that the un-
skilled in poor countries will beneﬁt, the underlying model we have in mind
is that we have two sectors, a skill- (or capital-) intensive importables sec-
tor and an unskilled-intensive exportables sector. In this world, indeed, the
only potentially relevant tariﬀ will be on the skill-intensive importable
which is also produced locally, hence lower its domestic price, and yield
precisely the eﬀect conventionally described.
We have already alluded to many of the problems that may arise, both
in theory and in data analysis, from thinking about our problem in these
highly aggregated terms. There may be ﬁnal goods that are noncompeting
and hence enter our consumer price index but don’t aﬀect our product
wages. If there are many such goods, it may be that some of these are more
skill intensive than the goods we produce and some may be yet more un-
skilled intensive than the products we produce. In data analysis, changes in
tariﬀs on truly noncompeting goods should be ignored in terms of eﬀects
on product wages. Unfortunately, the industry and tariﬀ data that we have
access to doesn’t provide any way to distinguish between goods that com-
pete with local production from goods that don’t. We will see below that
this is a potentially important problem for data analysis.
When we add to the case of more than two goods also the possibility that
there are more than two countries, we encounter another type of problem.
Even if we can continue to speak of our country as “unskilled abundant”
in global terms, and if we can continue to speak of it producing two goods,
it no longer follows which good will be the exportable one. As we will de-
velop in more detail below, the pattern of trade will depend on a country’s
“local” rather than global factor abundance. That is, we need to be able to
compare the country’s factor abundance to that of others that produce the
same sets of goods. Importantly, in our context, it is possible that it is tariﬀs
on the unskilled-intensive good that are binding, and it is thus possible that
trade liberalization lowers the price of the unskilled-intensive good pro-
duced locally, hurting those at the bottom of the ladder. In this type of
world, trade is almost certain to hurt those at the very bottom of the lad-
der in some countries (unless the reduction in the consumer price index
[CPI] from drops in tariﬀs on noncompeting goods suﬃciently compen-
sates for the fall in the real product wage).
The problem of aggregation of goods strikes again when we consider
traded intermediates. We know that a large share of trade is in intermedi-
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termediate products used in an industry must be treated diﬀerently from
tariﬀs on ﬁnal outputs produced locally—indeed, they enter with the op-
posite sign in the using industry. It is at least disconcerting, then, that much
of the literature on trade liberalization and wages in developing countries
either ignores the question of imported intermediates or provides poor
documentation of how it has been addressed. We are at least left worried
about how to interpret results.
2.2 Do Rich and Poor Countries Produce the Same Goods?
By now there is overwhelming evidence that, whether at the level of in-
dustries used in a great deal of empirical work, or even at very ﬁne levels of
disaggregation at which tariﬀs are applied, the goods in the import basket
are often quite diﬀerent from the domestically produced goods. They diﬀer
systematically in the factor input composition, and they diﬀer systemati-
cally in quality. Contrary to the way that we tend to treat them in both the-
oretical and data analyses, they are not perfect substitutes for the domes-
tically produced goods. Often it may be more appropriate to think of them
as noncompeting goods.
Let us spend a little time elaborating on this problem of aggregation.
One area in which the problem of international aggregation of goods arose
is in discussions of factor price equalization and measuring the factor con-
tent of international trade. In a pioneering study, Bowen, Leamer, and
Sveikauskas (1987; hereafter BLS) assembled data on twelve productive
factors for twenty-seven countries, calculated factor contents of trade,
and compared these to predictions based on endowment diﬀerences. In
calculating these factor contents for the central part of their paper, BLS
committed the data crime of assuming that all countries use the U.S. tech-
nology matrix (although they also explored some deviations from this).
Almost contemporaneously, Dollar, Wolﬀ, and Baumol (1988; hereafter
DWB) were examining correlations between industry factor input ratios
and country factor input availability. Assuming that all countries produce
the same goods and that there are no problems of aggregation, Rybczynski
(or its multigood multifactor equivalent) predicts that the correlation
should be zero. The actual correlation is much closer to unity.
Davis and Weinstein (2001) revisited the question of DWB.2Their initial
intent was to make adjustments for cross-country productivity diﬀerences
ignored by DWB and to demonstrate that, once this was done, we could
have factor price equalization (FPE) adjusted for factor quality. The key
idea was that FPE could be consistent with measured factor diﬀerences
within an industry if that industry contained many goods and if capital-
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2. See also Davis and Weinstein (2002).abundant countries had their within-industry production on average
skewed toward the more skill-intensive varieties. The key piece of evidence
they hoped to provide was to show that the correlation between capital
abundance and capital intensity within an industry arose only in traded
goods, where the aggregation issue was more likely, but not in nontraded
sectors, in which countries’ consumption bundles would need to be much
more similar. To their initial chagrin, Davis and Weinstein found that the
correlation was essentially as strong in nontraded as traded sectors. This
led them (and hopefully others!) to give up on trying to ﬁnd a way to pre-
serve any variant of “integrated equilibrium” as a useful way of thinking
even about the subset of rich countries in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Moreover, it led them to think
about a world with a high degree of specialization within the OECD, and
a fortiori across a broader set of countries.
A very similar message emerges from the important work of Schott
(2004). His work looks at price data at the most detailed available tariﬀ
categories for imports to the United States (in later years at the ten-digit
harmonized system). What he ﬁnds is that, even at this extremely disag-
gregated level, there are enormous diﬀerences in import prices (across
manufacturing industries by a mean factor of 24) and that the diﬀerences
are systematically related to levels of development. It may be a matter of
semantics whether we want to think of these as diﬀerences in quality or
simply diﬀerent goods—or probably more usefully as both. In combina-
tion with the earlier work, it strongly warns against thinking about imports
as if all goods within a particular category compete closely with domesti-
cally produced varieties.
As we launch further into a discussion of the impact of trade on wages
in the South, we have the beneﬁt of a very extended discussion of related is-
sues vis-à-vis the United States (and to a lesser extent Europe). This dis-
cussion helped us to learn (or rediscover) quite a bit about the workings of
our toy models. However—with a few notable exceptions—we are much
less convinced that the discussion told us a great deal about the impact of
international trade on U.S. wages. Indeed, much of the writing had what,
after the fact, can only seem to be a great air of unreality attached to it. An
example and an important strand of the literature constituted the so-called
factor content studies. These started out as empirical exercises that treated
the implicit net factor content (often, though not always, using U.S. coeﬃ-
cients) as a net addition or subtraction from the local labor supplies. The
empirical studies in turn inspired theoretical work, usually in a two-good
context, about the conditions under which such factor content calculations
are justiﬁed. It was often hard to know whether the greater unreality lay in
the ﬁction that all imports were the same as their domestic counterparts
(the assumption in virtually all of the analytic work) or the methods used
96 Donald R. Davis and Prachi Mishrato calculate factor contents in the rare case that it was noted that imports
and domestic goods are often not the same.
While it is easy to lash out at the studies that march forward as if it is ﬁne
to pretend that all countries produce the same goods, it is much harder to
advise theorists or data analysts quite what they are to do with such an un-
tidy world. Perhaps, though, a ﬁrst step is to become more aware of the
challenges that we face.
2.3 The Consequences of Moving to a More Complex World
Having set out our view that one of the great crimes in both theoretical
and data work is the assumption that all countries produce the same goods,
let us now spend a little time talking about how this might aﬀect the way
that we think about problems of trade liberalization and wages. A more
formal discussion of this is in Davis (1996). However, we think that a ver-
bal discussion of the results should suﬃce to make the major points. Fol-
lowing the injunction of Descartes, we will try to talk about this in the
simplest possible framework. Consider a world with a large number of
countries, no one of which is large enough to inﬂuence world prices. As-
sume that we are in a conventional Heckscher-Ohlin world in which the
two factors are skilled and unskilled labor. Assume that there are many
goods and that endowment diﬀerences are too large to support FPE. To
start, assume all goods are ﬁnal consumption goods (i.e., ignore interme-
diates). Again, for simplicity, assume that each of the resulting “cones” is
formed by just two goods and that they are produced with ﬁxed input ra-
tios. How will this aﬀect the standard theoretical results from the two-good
FPE model, and how should it aﬀect the way that we look at data exercises?
The ﬁrst thing to note is that there are some appealing features of such a
model. It matches well with the Davis-Weinstein results on breaks in (ad-
justed) FPE and is consistent with the Schott results when one notes that
our statistical categories have grouped goods of diﬀerent factor intensities
(and possibly also diﬀerent qualities) within the same industry. Moreover,
it helps to make sense of one of the robust features of the data work—
namely, that even countries that we think of as (unskilled) labor abundant
may protect their most labor-intensive activities. In a standard Heckscher-
Ohlin world, this would make no sense because this good would be an ex-
port, not an import! Here it makes perfect sense if we are looking at coun-
tries that are intermediate in labor abundance, since they may be importing
goods from countries of both greater and less capital (skill) intensity. Pro-
tection of a labor-intensive sector by a country that is in global terms itself
labor abundant is not an anomaly. One might then need a political econ-
omy account of why protection is higher in these sectors, but that is ﬁne.
While there are some appealing features of this model, this does not at
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portant fact about such a world is that, as in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin
model, factor prices are determined by technology and domestic goods
prices, but it is crucial to emphasize here that the relevant goods prices are
those produced domestically because the factor prices emerge out of the
binding zero-proﬁt conditions of producers (and only those goods actually
produced locally are relevant). Prices of imports not produced locally can
ﬁgure importantly in the CPI, hence real wages, but they ﬁgure not at all in
the product wages paid by producers. Hence, when we think about trade
liberalization in this context, it is crucial to distinguish between competing
goods (those produced locally) and noncompeting goods (those imported
but not locally produced). Trade liberalization with respect to competing
goods produces quasi-Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects, while such liberalization
with respect to noncompeting goods provides a pure consumption gain
and no Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects.
As noted, this is a huge headache for the empirical researcher. Assuming
again that within an industry the statistical agencies have grouped together
some goods that are competing and others that are noncompeting, then
only some of these tariﬀchanges should induce Stolper-Samuelson eﬀects.
But the empirical researcher is faced with the problem of deciding which
goods are which—not an easy task! In this simple framework, though,
theory does allow us to conjecture that the noncompeting goods are likely
to come from countries very diﬀerent (in endowments, but probably also in
technology) from the country under study.
If we loosen the grip of our analysis just a little here, so countries are not
purely small and tariﬀs on imports not produced locally do substitute (if
poorly) for locally produced varieties, then this might help us to under-
stand another seeming feature of the data exercises—that industry wage
premia respond weakly to tariﬀ changes (see the Blom et al. 2004 study of
Brazil and the Feliciano 2001 study of Mexico). While this is not the per-
fect setting to discuss this, the basic point is pretty clear: if local political
economy dictates the need to raise target factor prices, hence the relevant
domestic goods price, and the only available target is a good that substi-
tutes poorly for the local variety, then it will take a very large tariﬀ to raise
the price of the local good even a small amount. Taken in reverse, trade lib-
eralization against a good that is a poor substitute for a local variety will
aﬀect local factor prices only weakly (because they aﬀect the goods prices
only weakly).
While we have been pointing to the evils of ignoring aggregation, thus
far we have been focusing on the aggregation of diﬀerent goods produced
by diﬀerent countries into a common industry category. We have not spo-
ken as much about how the world changes when we allow for a world with
large numbers—say, a continuum—of goods produced even within a
country. Yet it is precisely in such models that a great deal of the most in-
98 Donald R. Davis and Prachi Mishrateresting work has been done. This work ﬁnds its foundation in the papers
of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977, 1980; hereafter DFS). The
most important contributions have come from Feenstra and Hanson
(1996), Xu (2003), and Melitz (2003).
Feenstra and Hanson’s work (1996) is often discussed as if it is primarily
a paper about intermediate trade. As a substantive matter, that is how they
developed it because they thought this was important to the case they fo-
cused on—namely, outsourcing from the United States to Mexico. For the
analytics, though, the novel insight was not the consideration of interme-
diates but rather the use of a model with a continuum of goods to think
about impacts on factor prices. The basic insight is pretty simple. In a two-
good DFS (1980) world without trade costs, goods at the boundary of
those produced in the United States and Mexico will be the most skill-
intensive goods in Mexico and simultaneously the least skill-intensive
goods in the United States. If accumulation in Mexico (due to capital in-
ﬂows, domestic capital accumulation, population expansion, etc.) shifts
the boundary to expand the range of goods produced in Mexico, the goods
added on will shift relative labor demand in favor of skilled workers in
Mexico and similarly in the United States. What is crucial to the example
is not that these are intermediates (although that was very apt in this case)
but rather that boundary goods are the most skill-intensive in one and the
least skill-intensive in the other. Impacts of neutral accumulation on factor
prices are likely to move the same direction in both countries.
While Feenstra and Hanson focus on the consequences of accumula-
tion shifting the boundary good, Xu (2003) considers the case of trade lib-
eralization. Trade liberalization now has several eﬀects to consider (for
convenience, ponder a case of symmetric liberalization). Liberalization
reduces the interval of nontraded goods at the margin of comparative
advantage. To continue the example, Mexico entirely stops producing
some of its most skill-intensive nontraded goods (the most skill-intensive
of all goods produced there) but expands production of some goods that
previously were nontraded but are now the most skill-intensive products
exported. At the same time, relative domestic prices of imports fall in each
country, shifting relative demand in each country toward importables. Xu’s
focus is to establish the possibility for a unilateral liberalization that the ex-
pansion of the range of exportables previously not traded can dominate,
shifting relative factor demand and factor prices in a way that enhances in-
equality.
It is worth pausing for a moment to ponder what it might look like if we
were to merge the DFS (1980) model with the Davis (1996) or Davis and
Weinstein (2001) approaches to trade relations—that is, to have a model
that allows for a continuum of goods, breaks in FPE, and many countries.
We don’t know whether anyone has sought analytic results in a general
equilibrium version of such a model. (The complexity even in the Xu set-
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pondering nonetheless because this is a case where twoness is almost cer-
tainly the exception instead of the rule. The more general and surely more
common case is that in which countries have two margins, one of greater
and one of lesser (skill-capital-technological) intensity corresponding to
countries above and below the country of interest. Whether both margins
are crucial in a particular case may depend on the nature of the policy
shock. A unilateral reform may more signiﬁcantly involve both margins,
whereas a bilateral free trade area (FTA) may have most of the adjustment
on one margin (although in general equilibrium, the other may be aﬀected
as well). This might help to understand the contrast in experience between
Mexico’s early unilateral liberalization and the later opening to the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA; see Robertson 2004).
Both Davis (1996) and Feenstra and Hanson (1996) oﬀer explanations
of how trade or investment can worsen the situation of those least well oﬀ
in a poor country. Davis (1996) focuses on the mechanism whereby even a
country that is labor abundant when compared to the world as a whole is
an importer of the labor-intensive good it actually produces, leading liber-
alization to lower the domestic price of that good and thus wages for the
poorer groups in that society. In Feenstra and Hanson, the mechanism is
that expansion of total output in the poorer country leads it to add new
goods at the margin to its production mix. In the case considered, the mar-
ginal goods shifted are at the expense of the Northern country. These be-
come the most skill- or capital-intensive of the goods produced in the
poorer country, which in turn shifts relative factor demand against un-
skilled labor there.
Topalova (chap. 7 in this volume) has suggested that liberalization in In-
dia may have worsened the situation of those least well oﬀ and emphasizes
that a lack of geographical and sectoral mobility may have contributed to
this. It is worth considering at least a very simple framework, consistent
with a multicone world, that makes the point. Suppose the world consists
of three countries, A (which we can consider the North or the rest of the
world [ROW]), B, and C (where the latter are two groups within India). For
simplicity, let this be an endowment economy where A has sugar, B (a rel-
atively skilled group) has tea, and C (the unskilled) has jaggery.3 When In-
dia’s trade barriers are high, members of group B can trade with C or not
trade at all. Tea with jaggery is not very attractive for a relatively well-oﬀ
group, but it is better than only tea. When the trade barriers come down,
all goods become in principle tradable. But members of group A only like
sugar and tea, not jaggery. Members of group B like sugar and tea, but they
will eat jaggery only when sugar is not available. Members of group C eat
jaggery because it is cheap and would love to eat sugar except that even af-
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3. Jaggery is a coarse unreﬁned sugar made from sugar cane juice.ter liberalization it is too expensive. Moreover, with group B now having
access to sugar, they want to sell less of their tea for jaggery, causing the rel-
ative price of jaggery to collapse. In eﬀect, the initial trade barriers gave the
poor a kind of monopoly power over B that disappears when B can trade
with the rest of the world—leaving C worse oﬀ.
Having thought about this model with a continuum of goods but no ap-
parent industries, it is worth thinking about what we should observe if each
industry is itself composed of a continuum of goods of varying factor
(technological) intensity. This forces us to think about the diﬀerence again
between averages and margins. A statement that a particular industry, for
example, is skill intensive is a statement about an average over an integral
across all varieties in that industry using production weights. Yet adjust-
ment is at the margins. An industry that is relatively unskilled intensive on
average may yet be expected to have production over a range of skill inten-
sities.
Melitz (2003) develops a model with heterogeneous ﬁrms deﬁned by
varying productivities. He shows how exposure to trade induces only the
more productive ﬁrms to enter the export market and simultaneously
forces the least productive ﬁrms to exit, leading to a rise in aggregate in-
dustry productivity. This model could be used to explain the ﬁndings in
Goh and Javorcik (chap. 8 in this volume) for Poland and Mishra and Ku-
mar (2005) for India. These papers ﬁnd that reduction in tariﬀs is associ-
ated with an increase in wages within the industry. Trade liberalization
could lead to an interﬁrm reallocation toward more productive ﬁrms and
a rise in aggregate industry productivity, which gets passed on to industry
wages.
Verhoogen (2004) reexamines the case of Mexico to question the exist-
ing interpretations of rising wage inequality there till the mid-1990s. His
ﬁrst observation is that the rise in the relative skilled wage did not come
about due to a shift in relative demand across industries in favor of those
using skilled workers more intensively. He shows that the shift in relative
outputs in Mexico in the relevant period actually were in favor of unskilled
and low-capital-intensity sectors. Instead he focuses on within-industry
shifts. His hypothesis is that within industries, ﬁrms diﬀer in productivity,
with the more productive ﬁrms exporting (as in Melitz 2003), and that
there is diﬀerentiation in product quality (Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse
1992). When new opportunities for trade arise—due in the case he exam-
ines to the sharp devaluation of the peso—these new opportunities are
seized by these most productive ﬁrms. These ﬁrms produce a better-quality
good for export than for the domestic market in order to appeal to richer
developed-country consumers. Producing high-quality goods requirespay-
ing higher wages to all workers but especially to skilled workers, raising
returns to all factors in those ﬁrms, but particularly to the most skilled.
Here, the counterpart to the “technical change” argument that has been
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counts for the within-industry shift in relative factor demand even as the
across-industry shift would seem to point the other way.
It may seem odd that in a paper notionally devoted to theory one of the
requests we have for empirical researchers is to spend more time describ-
ing the data and how they are handled. An example is the treatment of
tariﬀs on intermediates. An elementary point is that a tariﬀ on goods com-
peting with a local producer’s outputs provides protection, but a tariﬀ on
its inputs is antiprotective. But in many of the papers we look in vain for
the words intermediate or input-output in a description of the impact of
tariﬀs. We simply don’t know how the issue of tariﬀs on intermediates has
been addressed. But clearly the fact that it reverses the sign of the antici-
pated eﬀect of a tariﬀ should suﬃce to draw some discussion. We all know
that the researcher did not get to design the data collection and that it may
be less than ideal for the task at hand. Confess your data crimes and much
will be forgiven. And much more will be learned.
2.4 Economics and Geography
One of the most important analytic developments in the study of trade
of the 1990s is that of economic geography.4 The analytic underpinnings
are very simple: Dixit-Stiglitz production and costs of trade. While the
models come in many variants, a large number of them yield provocative
predictions about the nature of economic development and the diﬃculties
faced by countries and international institutions in moving poor countries
out of poverty. Trade liberalization need not help! Indeed, trade liberaliza-
tion in these contexts has two faces. One is the improved access that you
have to sell your products abroad. However, the other, particularly for a
small country, is the possibility that the market becomes a site of con-
sumption but not of production, at least of the crucial increasing-returns
activities that yield high real wages. This certainly should not be inter-
preted as a blanket rationale for import substitution activities. But it does
provide additional paths of serious inquiry into the costs and beneﬁts of
protection.
One of the more interesting analyses relevant to our problem is con-
tained in Puga and Venables (1996). They consider a problem in which a
country of the North, say Japan, has rising world demand for its products.
Those products incorporate both high- and low-order activities. With the
rising demand, wages rise in Japan, making it attractive to outsource some
of the low-order activities to other locations. The question is to which
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4. For monographs on the theory, see Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) and Baldwin
et al. (2003). Early work on the empirics includes Davis and Weinstein (1996, 1999). More re-
cent empirical work includes Redding and Venables (2004), Hanson and Xiang (2004), and
Davis and Weinstein (2004).country the outsourcing will be done. If we are in a neoclassical world, then
if there are many similarly situated countries—in terms of geography, pol-
icy, labor skill, and so on—each such similar country will get a similar
share of the outsourcing. However, if we are instead in an “economic geo-
graphy” world in which local sourcing of intermediate activities is crucial
to the productivity in this outsourcing, then there will have to be both win-
ners and losers. Some country or countries will receive this outsourcing
and others will not. Those that do receive it will see demand for their labor
rise and real wages rise, possibly very signiﬁcantly; but this will not be so in
the other countries.
These kinds of models present very signiﬁcant problems in cross-
country analyses. The cross-country analyses assume that outcomes are
smooth in the policy variables. In the economic geography world, out-
comes are lumpy.
In addition to the problems that these kinds of models present to the
statistician, they present a yet greater problem to the policymaker. If the in-
teraction of technology and geography dictates that Japan is going to out-
source to just one country, then a dozen could pursue “good policies” yet
only one emerge victorious.
2.5 Trade and Growth
The discussion to this point has treated theoretical considerations from
the perspective of comparative statics. This is a very useful perspective,
particularly for the purpose of understanding short- to medium-horizon
impacts. However, it is ultimately limited, and perhaps decisively ﬂawed,
for three reasons. The ﬁrst is simply that over any reasonable horizon, the
magnitudes of growth impacts swamp magnitudes of comparative static
impacts. The second, which is crucial here, is that the answers we receive as
to the comparative static versus dynamic eﬀects of liberalization need not
be the same. Finally, when dynamic considerations exist—that is, in the
world we actually inhabit(!)—one cannot really make sense even of com-
parative statics unless one has an eye on the dynamics that govern the
movements of resources. All of these elements point to the need to explic-
itly consider links between trade liberalization and growth.
It is useful to start with a perfect competitive market view of trade and
growth. Stiglitz (1970) considered such a world with a dynamic Heckscher-
Ohlin model. In this model, autarkic diﬀerences in capital-labor ratios
arose endogenously from deeper parameters reﬂecting rates of time dis-
count. The patient country would accumulate a great deal of capital per
worker in the autarkic steady state relative to the impatient country. Sev-
eral key conclusions emerge from Stiglitz’s work. The ﬁrst is that trade
leads to greater divergence in accumulation and specialization in produc-
tion. The logic is quite simple. Assuming the initial diﬀerences in endow-
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across the trading partners. Incipiently this raises the return to capital in
the country already abundant in it and reduces it in the other country. Ac-
cumulation resumes in the capital-abundant country and decumulation
sets in in the other country. Per capita incomes diverge. Since the rates of
return must equal parametrically distinct national discount rates to be in a
steady state, this can only arise if endowment diﬀerences become suﬃ-
ciently great to break FPE (and under the assumption of barriers to capi-
tal ﬂows that would be suﬃcient to arbitrage diﬀerences in factor returns).
As noted, in the long run, the initial diﬀerences in per capita income would
increase. Nonetheless, in this perfect-markets equilibrium, there are dy-
namic gains even for the country that in the long run will have a lower per
capita income as a result of trade. The reason, of course, is that along the
path to the new steady state it is possible to enjoy a higher level of con-
sumption that more than compensates for the lower steady-state level of
consumption.
A ﬁrst path into dynamic questions of trade liberalization in imperfect
markets may come from a consideration of models of learning by doing
such as those of Robert Lucas (1988) and Alwyn Young (1991). The im-
perfection in question is that learning here enters as an external eﬀect pro-
portional to production. Lucas considers this in a two-country, two-good
framework, where the goods are distinguished according to fundamental
rates of learning opportunity. The ﬁrst insight from the Lucas framework
is that if learning is external, even transitory diﬀerences in comparative ad-
vantage can determine long-term growth opportunities. A country whose
learning opportunities are diminished as a result of assignment by com-
parative advantage to slow-learning sectors may yet experience not only
static but dynamic gains from trade as learning in the other country is
passed on through lower prices. The central insight of Young is to place
this squarely in a North-South context. He introduces the idea that learn-
ing is bounded and sequential. The North is further along in its learning
path. The consequence is that it introduces a presumption that trade liber-
alization releases labor from sectors where learning is exhausted to be de-
ployed in sectors where learning opportunities still exist, and vice versa for
countries of the South. Because of the possibility of real income gains from
the consumption side, this does not quite establish dynamic losses from
trade, but it is certainly suggestive of this possibility, as comparative ad-
vantage dictates that production in the South be shifted toward sectors
where learning is exhausted. Davis (1992) has argued that the restriction of
this discussion to small dimensions in countries, goods, or both tends to
understate the opportunities particularly for small countries to enjoy dy-
namic gains by specializing their learning in a small number of sectors. It
is much easier to converge to the world productivity frontier in one or a few
sectors than many.
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Romer (1986) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), advanced greatly the dis-
cussion of the dynamics of trade and income. This is a rich body of work
and can only be touched on here. The central issues of interest are that they
consider the engine of growth to be innovation and imitation, which in turn
are purposeful activities driven by the incentives that markets provide to
ﬁrms. The traditional incentives to augment capital as in Stiglitz (1970) are
here augmented by incentives to invest in knowledge. A fundamental ele-
ment is that knowledge is nonrival (although it may be excludable). There
are gains to the world (and potentially to all countries) from having to dis-
cover things only once. There are likewise gains to the world from having
innovation take place where it is least costly. Of course, many of the prior
concerns about the distribution of these gains across countries emerge yet
again here. Moreover, with markets imperfect, both the level and the loca-
tion of innovation can be nonoptimal (and possibly the level even too
great!).
2.6 Conclusions
This volume is dedicated to understanding the impact of globalization
on poverty in poor countries. This paper has tried to discuss the theory that
is most relevant for such a discussion in the context of trade liberalization.
Since the question of the impact of trade liberalization on the poor in poor
countries is such an obviously important question, it is a major embar-
rassment to the profession that we understand it so poorly. This volume
takes many important steps forward, but the need for further inquiry is
manifest.
Certainly a starting point is to cast oﬀ the shibboleths of Stolper-
Samuelson in its global form as a useful way to think about the world that
we actually live in. Insights from growth theory and from the theory of eco-
nomic geography, as well as more traditional theories, will be important in
moving us forward.
The empirical work contained in this volume, in combination with other
work outside, has been extraordinarily useful. Its use will be all the greater
if we spend less time coming up with immediately tidy explanations and
spend more time identifying the puzzling aspects of the problem. They
should not be in short supply. For the studies of trade liberalization, the
most pressing line for further inquiry should be understanding the extent
and process of reallocation. This will need to be studied with detailed ref-
erence to institutions and local characteristics. Labor market rigidities may
explain why declining industries ﬁnd it hard to ﬁre workers. But it is hard
to understand why expanding industries are not drawing in many of these
same workers. It is not clear yet that there is a fully consistent story.
There is an old joke about a drunkard who explains that although he lost
Stolper-Samuelson Is Dead: And Other Crimes of Both Theory and Data 105his keys in the park down the street he is looking for them here under the
lamppost because the light is so much better. A lot of our theoretical and
empirical work has a taste of this logic. And it is not entirely crazy, because
our toy models do give us useful insights and the empirical work gives us
some views of the data that might surprise and so inspire us. We hope,
though, that we have made the case that in this untidy world of ours it
might make sense to spend some time in the dark, on our knees, groping
for the keys.
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